Over the past 30 years, Bangladesh has become a chronic food-deficit country which has relied increasingly on food grain imports to sustain its rapidly growing population at minium calorie levels. These averaged four per cent of domestic production in the 1950s, nine per cent in the 1960s, and 15 per cent in the 1970s. During the 1950s, most food grain imports were purchased commercially by the government, but since 1963 the major portion has been supplied as food aid. Since 1976, food aid has contributed nearly 90 per cent of total food grain imports and has constituted over 10 per cent of total food grain availability.
The extent of Bangladesh's dependence on food aid -it is one of the main recipients in the developing world -gives rise to concern about its efficacy as a resource-transfer. Conventional wisdom maintains that high levels of food-aid imports cause disincentives to local producers through agricultural policy and prices, leading to a decline in investment in and output from domestic agriculture. In the absence of a general equilibrium price and output determination model, this article examines the evidence in Bangladesh of disincentives (and incentives) for the agricultural sector from food aid, focusing on foodgrains which predominate in farming and are most directly affected by food aid. The analysis centres on four questions relating to the structure of incentives facing Bangladeshi farmers. First, have agricultural prices been too low -absolutely and relatively -during the past 25 years of food-aid imports? Second, if output prices had been higher without (or with less) food aid, what would have been the likely output response? Third, is there evidence of complacency among policymakers toward public-sector agricultural investment and development policies because of food aid? Fourth, did food aid provide any incentives to agriculture? ' This article is based on a chapter in a doctoral dissertation at Stanford University entitled The impact offoodaidon the Bangladesh economy. The views expressed are solely those of the author. Bulletin, 1983, vol Were Agricultural Prices too Low? Given the high volume of food grain imports to Bangladesh during the past 25 years, there is little doubt that food grain prices have been lower than they would have been without imports. Since the major portion of imports came as food aid, food aid must bear responsibility for part of this price moderation. The question then is whether or not the prevailing food grain prices were a discentive to farmers. To hold scarcity prices in check is quite different from depressing prices that are barely remunerative to start with. Moreover, in land-scarce Bangladesh, where traditioflal rain fed agriculture had begun to press on natural limits to production by mid-century, the issues of technological change and the opportunity to invest in modern inputs weigh heavily in the discussion.
Inter-sectoral terms of trade
The domestic terms of trade between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are an important determinant of the distribution of income between sectors. As such, they provide a measure of each sector's capacity to save and invest generally, or, more specifically, a measure of the incentives to produce and sell products to the other sector.
The terms of trade for agriculture in India at the time of independence and partition were 40-50 per cent higher than the 25-year average prior to the 1943 wartime Bengal famine [Wall 1978] . While these estimates for the pre-independence period in India are not applicable to Bangladesh, Government of Pakistan [1951] data for the 1947 to 1950 periodusing the common 1939 baseyear index for India and Pakistan -suggest that the agricultural terms of trade in Bangladesh remained highly favourable, with the GDP, at constant prices, of total agriculture also rising at 2.8 per cent per annum up to FY54 (financial year: July 1953 -June 1954 .
Following the end of the Korean war boom, the domestic terms of trade in Bangladesh moved decidedly against the agricultural sector and production declined, reaching an historical low in FY 55. This adverse trend reversed the following year, and agriculture's terms-of-trade position improved steadily throughout the subsequent decade. By FY 69 the terms of trade in favour of agriculture were the highest in history, roughly 40 per cent higher than in FY 52. During this same period, food grain imports had risen from 2 to 10 per cent of net domestic availability. (Net availability production less 10 per cent allowance for storage losses and retention for seed plus imports plus net carry over of public stocks.)
No detailed analysis of the domestic terms of trade in Bangladesh has been made for the l970s. The price of rice relative to the price of manufactured goods, which provides an approximation of the agricultural terms of trade, indicates wide fluctuations but no apparent trend. Between FY 71 and FY 80, food aid constituted 10 per cent of net food grain availability; imports constituted 14 per cent. From FY 74, food grain production has grown at an estimated rate of 2.5 per cent per annum.
Given the complex procedures of negotiating and ordering food aid commodities and the time lags involved with shipping and local transport, reliance on food aid probably exacerbated the fluctuations in rice prices and thus the fluctuations in the rice/manufactures price ratio [Clay 1981] . But the evidence suggests that agricultural producer incentives, as indicated by the domestic terms of trade, were not significantly distorted by food aid or by total food grain imports.
The terms-of-trade indices discussed above relate agricultural prices to the weighted price of all manufactures. The denominator includes manufactured consumption goods as well as agricultural inputs. For traditional agricultural systems that use a low level of purchased inputs, such terms-of-trade measures are appropriate. But as the technology shifts toward modern practices that employ increasing amounts of purchased inputs, a terms-of-trade index that relates agricultural prices to the prices of agricultural inputs becomes more indicative of producer incentives. The rice/fertiliser price ratio indicates a slight upward trend from FY 57 to FY 75, but a 40 per cent decline thereafter, reflecting a reduction in fertiliser subsidies in the late-l970s.
Nevertheless, all the fertiliser that has been supplied during the past two decades -including the last five years -has been taken by farmers, and fertiliser is still a relatively small component of total agricultural production costs, some 20 per cent of purchased input costs for HYV (high yielding variety) rice cultivation. Note: annual data by Lewis and Hussain [1967] and Lewis [1970] adjusted to a 1961/62 baseyear to coincide with Wall's [1978] historical series.
There has been a gradual upward trend for two decades in the rice/wage price ratio. But the decline in mechanised irrigation and rice production more generally was not solely a question of relative prices. First, 42 per cent of the decline in pump renting occurred in two southern districts, Barisal and Patuakhali, where, according to field reports, farmers' grain stores were literally overflowing from previous good harvests. In these two districts transportation, marketing and government procurement have traditionally been less developed than in northern districts. Similar problems occurred in other districts, in spite of a stepped up domestic procurement programme which netted more than three times the previous record procurement. Second, 45 per cent of the decline in output occurred in one district, Sylhet, where early flooding destroyed much of the crop. Third, fertiliser offtake, in spite of a substantial real price increase, rose at nearly the same rate as total fertiliser offtake increased for the entire year.
High-yielding varieties (HYVs) subsidies on HYV seeds, both imported and locally multiplied, in terms of supply costs have been relatively small. Once released, HYV seeds can be multiplied by farmers themselves and, consequently, an active private market exists for seeds. Regarding the relative profitability of HYVs, the average benefit/cost ratios referred to above suggest that HYV cultivation has been uniformly more profitable than traditional variety cultivation on farmers' fields during the same season.
Domestic and international prices of rice
For traded commodities, the comparison of domestic prices with world prices is a commonly used indicator of distortions in agricultural output prices. Table 1 suggests that during the past two decades, in spite of Table 1 Comparison of domestic and international prices of rice the high level of food imports, the domestic price of rice in Bangladesh in most years was considerably higher than the international price, even after discounting for an overvalued exchange rate. For Bangladesh, the ratios reflect the low productivity in agriculture combined with growing demand due to population and income factors.
However, in the late 1970s, the domestic/international price ratio at the shadow exchange rate dropped below ratio of domestic to international price at SER 'medium quality, Dacca market. 2 SER = shadow exchange rate. Calculated with a scarcity conversion factor of 0.75 of the official exchange rate (0ER). 3i of Thai 35 per cent brokens under government-to-government contracts with transport differential of 7 per cent to Chittagong, the main port. p provisional Another relevant measure compares input/output price structures across countries. PetFrson [1979] in estimating real prices received by farmers in 53 countries by deflating money prices of output with money prices of fertilizer found that during 1968-70 farmers in Pakistan received real prices because of fertiliser subsidies nearly as high as farmers in the major developed, exporting countries, where output prices were heavily supported by the respective governments.
Commerical imports in addition to food aid flows In the Asian context, the price of rice is perhaps the single most important barometer for measuring social well-being and political stability. In self-interest and in the interests of its citizens, governments are always attuned to the rice markets and often intervene quickly The supply functions estimated related area of production to prices of the previous years, and variables representing weather, variability of prices (risk) and a time trend. A complementary attempt to measure price effects on yield or total output were unsuccessful (for food grains and rice). In the estimated food grain output equations, for example, only trend and rainfall were significant, and together they explained over 80 per cent of the annual variation in output.
The estimated short-run price elasticity of supply of acreage is positive but low, at about 0. 
Food Aid and Agricultural Policy Complacency
Changing sectoral priorities
The role of food aid in the evolution of development policy is a complex issue of political economy. In 1959
there was a clear shift of emphasis in policy for East Pakistan towards encouraging agricultural development. This followed years of neglect and stagnation in the agricultural sector. It also followed the advent of the food aid programme which provided direct support for meeting short-run welfare demands, due to growing food deficits, without necessitating cuts in long-run development investment. The productivity 46 gains of the l960s and 1970s reflect the increased priority attached to agriculture (Figure 2 Concurrent with increased agricultural investment, which focused on the supply and subsidisation of modern agricultural inputs, the government enacted several policy changes favourable to the farm sector. Export duties on jute and other export commodities were reduced. Marketing, price, and procurement controls on food grains were eased. In addition, an internal food grain buffer stock system was initiated to help stabilise prices. Studies by Falcon and Gotsch [1966] and Mason [1966] The budget share allocated to the agricultural sector (including water resources and rural development) was 26.3 per cent. However, because the performance of public-sector expenditure in agriculture was significantly better than in most other sectors, the estimated actual share going to agriculture during the plan period was 32 per cent (see Table 2 ). The better performance of agriculture reflects in part the higher priority attached to the sector in annual development budgets as distinct from the Five Year Plan. On the other hand, there was a downward trend in the share of annual development expenditure allocated to the agricultural sector during the l970s.
Separating out the components of this trend indicates the danger of making inferences from movements in budgetary aggregates. The relative decline in agriculture's share came primarily in the water and flood control subsector. This reflects the policy shift in the late 1 970s to transferring small-scale irrigation into the private sector and the reduction in irrigation subsidies. Institutional rigidities, especially in the large-scale irrigation subsector, also led to indecision about future investment strategies. There was a slight upward trend in the agricultural subsector share which includes crop research, extension and input supply.
Development budget figures can also be misleading in that they often include current expenditure components which cannot be considered as development investments. In addition to supporting agriculture, through increased development expenditure, other government policies and programmes have benefited the rural sector -directly and indirectly -during the food aid era. Several policy reforms that were made in the early 1960s were mentioned above. Others, that were made in the 1970s after liberation, pertain to procurement, taxation and exchange-rate policies.
Food grain operations: the government has operated an internal rice procurement programme in Bangladesh almost continuously since the wartime period of the 1940s. The initial motivation for procurement was to secure through compulsory levy all surplus grain that was available in the countryside for public-sector ration distribution in non-producer, mainly urban, areas. It was fundamentally a supply operation, not a price support mechanism for farmers [Knight 1954 ].
Government ration shop in Dacca.
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The system remained essentially unchanged through the 1950s and 1960s, with compulsory procurement maintained primarily in the border areas to discourage smuggling. In most areas procurement was generally voluntary. In absolute terms, or as a percentage of public-sector food distribution, the procurement programme up to the mid-1970s was not large. The procurement price did, however, function in varying degrees as a floor price to farmers. Once more in 1973-76 the government reverted in a food crisis situation to compulsion to sustain supplies to the public distribution system, giving prominence to procurement sustained by the subsequent change of policy.
In 1975/76, the government began to use procurement explicitly as an instrument of producer price support: the procurement price of rice was raised substantially relative to market prices, and it was announced during the aman planting period (previously, prices had been announced at harvest time). Thus, procurement prices began to function more as incentive support prices for farmers than as floor prices, and the response was dramatic. Curiously, food aid played a key role in the procurement policy shift, although in a rather perverse way. Food aid donors had informally agreed to underwrite total import requirements for Bangladesh; but cereals food aid is virtually all wheat, which does not satisfy the ration system requirements for rice, the preferred grain. To satisfy its ration system constituents (public servants, military, students, etc), the government had to turn to domestic procurement a the source of rice. The primary motivation for procurement, as in the early years, was still to supply the ration system. Whatever the motivation, the effects for farmers of a more positive procurement policy dependent on voluntary sales were higher effective floor prices and some degree of price stabilisation. Again, as with subsidies on inputs, the intersectoral resource transfers inherent in procurement purchases primarily benefited surplus farmers with access to the procurement system.
Agriculture's declining tax burden: the history of agricultural (primarily land) taxation in Bengal is long and controversial. What is striking about the recent past is the virtual absence of all direct taxes on the agricultural sector, the sector which accounts for more than half of GDP. During the early 1950s, after abolition of Zamindari intermediaries, land revenues accounted for roughly 15 per cent of total direct tax receipts. The percentage rose to 30 per cent by the early 1960s, but dropped back to 15 per cent for the remainder of the decade. In addition to land taxes, the government taxed upper-level agricultural incomes, mainly the tea estates, which yielded two per cent of total tax revenues during the 1960s.
In 1972 after liberation, the new Bangladesh Government effectively eliminated agricultural land taxes by exempting virtually all except tea estates. Further, the government suspended agricultural income taxes in 1974, and abolished them altogether two years later. While some incidental local taxes remained in the post-liberation period, the direct tax burden of the agricultural sector during the past decade has been virtually nil.
The net indirect tax burden on agriculture is difficult to determine. The standard argument that low food prices due to food aid imports have taxed farmers excessively does not seem to hold in view of the price analysis above. That food imports prevented higher profits or resource transfers to agriculture by dampening scarcity prices is certain. However, Bangladesh has almost continually had an overvalued exchange rate which implicitly taxed exports but kept import prices low, with both positive and negative implications for agriculture. Modern inputs to production -mostly imported -have been cheaper, benefiting food grain production, an importsubstitution activity which has utilised most of the imported inputs. But jute production, which is largely exported, has been taxed indirectly by overvaluation (the benefits from cheaper input prices notwithstanding). Given the relative importance of sectoral earnings from rice versus jute, the net benefit to the farm sector from overvaluation has probably been positive, although for individual farmers the reverse may have been the case.
Resource constraints and aid dependency
Bangladesh has had a persistent balance of payments problem. Most capital and many intermediate goods, including energy, have necessarily been imported, while export earnings to finance imports have been derived predominantly from a single agricultural commodity: jute. The growing food deficits and consequent food imports have cut into the forign exchange resources available for development imports. Moreover, as jute and rice compete for land, periodic food crop short-falls have inevitably led to short-run declines in jute acreage and production which in turn reduced foreign exchange earnings, adding to current account deficits and long-term debt. The second terms-of-trade crisis occurred in the early 1970s during the period of rapid inflation in world food and energy prices. The overall terms of trade fell 32 per cent in one year, and reached a low point two years later at 56 per cent of the pre-crisis level. This crisis hit just after liberation when the economy was still in disarray, and it was compounded by a series of poor harvests caused by drought and flooding which simultaneously increased the need for food imports and reduced the quantities ofjute available for export.
The severity of the balance of payments problem facing Bangladesh in the 1970s is reflected in the ratio of annual export earnings to import expenditures which for most of the decade was less than 40 per cent. In contrast, during the entire decade of the l960s, East Pakistan exports covered 84 per cent of total visible imports, including inter-wing trade with West
Pakistan.
In the short-term, Bangladesh had little recourse but to depend on foreign aid to meet minimum food consumption requirements and to maintain development projects and investments. By the late l970s, total foreign aid flows to Bangladesh as accounted in the budget were equivalent to more than 10 per cent of GDP and 75 per cent of development expenditures [World Bank 1980] . Food aid in the latter period contributed roughly one-quarter of total foreign aid.
Food aid helped to mitigate the balance of payments crisis of the mid-1970s. But Bangladesh was still obliged to purchase substantial quantities of food commercially [Islam 1977 [Islam :1111 . In fact, in its attempt to ensure a minimum supply of food grains, the country spent itself into 'bankruptcy' in 1974, which meant that it had to agree to a consortium of aid donors under the auspices of the World Bank. In spite of the high level of food imports -which, relative to total export revenues, were two and one-half times higher than in any other major food-deficit country during the late 1960s and early 1970s {Siamwalla and
Valdes 1980] -significant adjustments in food consumption were also taking place internallypeople went hungry and starved. Table 3 shows the relationship between aid resource transfers and export Table 3 50
Aid disbursements compared with export earnings in Bangladesh (million US dollars -current)
Notes: ' 70-75 per cent of export earnings come from jute and jute commodities 2 provisional figures. Source: Planning Commission; IBRD [l980. earnings during the l970s. In FY 75, total current export earnings would not even have paid for food-aid imports, let alone the 687,000 tons of commercial food imports and all other imports items.
Public sector domestic resource mobilisation for current and investment expenditures has also been closely linked to foreign trade and aid. On the one hand, taxes on imports have consistently provided about one-third of total government revenue in the l970s, even though a few 'items of essential need' such as food grains, edible oils, fertiliser, and seed have been exempt from import duties. On the other hand, but not accounted for in the revenue budget, concessional commodity aid that is sold domestically on government account has generated substantial extra-budgetary finance, so-called counterpart funds.
For example, in 1978-79, food grain imports to Bangladesh totalling 1,165,000 tons were financed on concessional terms, the financial cost to Bangladesh being only 10 per cent of cif value. Subsequent ration system sales resulted in a net financial contribution from food aid equivalent to 11 per cent of total revenue, or nine per cent of the total development expenditure, in 1978/79. The implicit budgetary dependence on food aid was even higher in most other years during the 1970s.
Budgetary dependence on food aid involves an inherent conflict between aid and agricultural development, which is manifest in the opposite perspectives of a recient country's finance and agriculture ministries. of food aid resource transfers, is a subject only for speculation.
In principle, counterpart funds from food aid sales are supposed to be used only for development projects. In practice, their use is virtually impossible to document.
Even where they are explicitly linked to additional activities, assessment is ultimately a matter of judgement. During the 1970s in Bangladesh, the consumption subsidies transferred through the ration system were greater than the revenues generated by the sale of food aid commodities. In the absence of these counterpart funds, the high level of consumption subsidies simply could not have been maintained without a significant reduction in development expenditure. Recent history has also shown that during periods of financial crisis, successive governments have steadily maintained the food subsidies, which, in effect, has made development investment and implementation a residual category. The consumption imperative as perceived by the government has thus determined, in part, the level and pace of development.
Even if the food subsidies were significantly rçduced or phased out entirely, the larger issue for Bangladesh is the need to mobilise additional resources from within. During the l950s, the gross domestic savings rate in Pakistan averaged roughly six per cent of GNP. By the late l960s, the rate for East Pakistan had risen to 10 per cent [Alamgir and Rahman 1974] , but in the context of political and economic policies that ultimately brought about the painful birth of an independent Bangladesh.
The crises of the post-liberation period, however, brought about a collapse of the economy to the extent that 101 per cent of the GDP in 1977 went for current consumption, at lowerper cap ita levels than during the 1960s. Aggregate domestic savings were negative. Foreign aid was equivalent to total investment plus one per cent of current consumption.
Ultimately this decentralised programme, linked to the increasingly corrupted and discredited system of basic democracy [Sobhan 1968 ] collapsed in the period of political instability leading up to the liberation war. The major economic criticism levelled at the programmes is not that rural works have failed to enhance productive capacity but that the distribution of likely benefits would be highly skewed to landlords and richer surplus producers.
For a variety of reasons, including the general breakdown in administration, the public works programme in Bangladesh initially lacked momentum during the post-liberation period. The character of the programme was changed dramatically before it began to expand rapidly in the mid-l970s. First, it had been transferred from the Ministry of Rural Development to the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation. Second, the design of works projects was now centralised in the new ministry, but the projects were actually controlled by various outside (foreign) agencies and implemented through local contractors rather than through local government committees. Third, and related to this, there were problems of coordination between different projects within the same regions. Fourth, wages were now paid in kind, not out of counterpart funds; hence the new name: the Food for Work Programme. This programme, the largest supported by food aid, has been the subject of intense controversy. The in-depth evaluation by the Bangladesh Institute of Development
Studies and IFPRI will, it is hoped, produce a broad and balanced assessment of the impact of food for work.
Food aid and market development
One criticism of food aid has rested on the 'inappropriate commodity' argument: supplying wheat to a rice culture, it is argued, not only represents a form of cultural imperialism, but the practice over time might also develop a country's taste, and therefore a demand, for a product which in some environments can only be imported.
In Bangladesh the argument cannot be sustained in this simple form. First, while it is true that wheat has been, and still is, considered an inferior commodity compared to rice, its supply has represented a cheaper source of calories than rice, whether through concessional or commercial purchase importation. The different demand elasticities for wheat and rice across income groups reflecting actual consumption suggests an opportunity for targeting the benefits from food aid wheat to the poor. The extent to which this has been achieved requires careful analysis of the operation of the public distribution system [Ahmed l979].
4See for example Jackson [1982] for a summary of critical evidence and further references.
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Second, many regions (soil types) in Bangladesh are well-suited for the production of wheat during the dry season, with or without irrigation. The development of a taste for wheat through exposure to food aid over the past 25 years has spurred a domestic market and thereby facilitated a rapid expansion of wheat production. From about 23,000 tons annually during the l950s, wheat production rose to some 200,000 tons by the late 1960s, and to around 12 mn tons in 1980/81. The wheat boom of the late l970s more than compensated for the slower growth in rice production during the same period. It had a significant positive effect on output of calories and protein and rural employment, even allowing for substitution of wheat for pulses and oilseeds.
Conclusions
Bangladesh is frequently cited as an example of the adverse affects of food aid on domestic agriculture.
Yet the evidence does not sustain this view. The direct price effects of food-aid imports to Bangladesh during the past 25 years do not appear to have caused disincentives to farmers; rather, domestic rice prices for most of the period were higher than world prices.
Nor did the domestic terms of trade move against farmers, nor the profitability of food grain production decline vis-à-vis other crop alternatives. The highyielding varieties that were introduced during the l960s greatly enhanced profitability.
The major constraint on the growth of food grain productivity and production was the inadequate supply of modern agricultural inputs, which was primarily due to an overall capital resource constraint in Bangladesh. A wider analysis of the rural economy also suggests that there are other structural constraints on facilitating agricultural development through the price mechanism. Only a small minority of producers are well placed to benefit from output price incentives and have favoured access to subsidised inputs.
Food aid resource transfers made a major contribution toward alleviating the foreign exchange constraint, thus allowing for higher investment in intermediate goods imports than would have been the case without food aid. Regarding development policy, the evidence suggests that the food aid resource transfers were used more efficiently, or productively, during the l960s than during the l970s, but in a context that probably was not sustained. The l970s have been more turbulent in terms of both the domestic political, and the world economic, environment. The tensions in macro economic and agricultural sector policies are more severe. It is, however, difficult to envisage a sustainable counterfactual scenario in which significantly lower levels of food aid would have resulted in more rapid and equitable agricultural development.
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